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INTRODUCTION:
FORCED ARBITRATION IN 2014 AND THE WAFFLE HOUSE EXCEPTION
In 2014, we reach a key milestone with the fiftieth anniversary of the
passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").' This
landmark federal legislation, which prohibits discrimination in the
workplace, also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC").2 This Article focuses on the use of arbitration, a form of
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), to decide federal employment
discrimination claims brought under that and related statutes.' Specifically,
this Article addresses the use of so-called "mandatory,"4  "forced,"
I. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2-
2000e-17 (2012)); see also Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of Title VII: First Principles - Enacting the
Civil Rights Act and Using the Courts to Challenge and Remedy Workplace Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL
EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (June 22, 2004),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/40th/panel/firstprinciples.html (describing the legislative history of
Title VII culminating with its "pass[age] in June 1964 by strong bipartisan majorities in both houses [of
Congress], and signed into law by President [Lyndon Baines] Johnson on July 2, 1964").
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-12 (2012); see Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL
EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 31,
2013) (referring to the laws the EEOC enforces, including Title VII as amended).
3. Any discussion of the use of ADR in addressing employment discrimination claims has
historically started with arbitration especially after employers began pursuing arbitration as a strategy to
circumvent jury trials allowed by Title VII's amendment in 1991. See Michael Z. Green, Addressing
Race Discrimination Under Title VII After Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence,
48 How. L.J. 937, 942 (2005) [hereinafter Green, Addressing Race Discrimination]. Typically, with
arbitration, the parties select a neutral outsider to resolve their dispute as the final decision maker. See
Martin Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or Nothing
Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 295 (2012) (quoting the benefits of arbitration from a plaintiff's attorney,
Paul Tobias, because the employee can "'tell the story to a neutral party"' instead of being subjected to
summary judgment"). Arbitration differs from other ADR methodologies, such as mediation, where
typically the neutral outsider is not a decision-maker and only helps the parties craft their own
resolution. Although there are other forms of ADR that may more closely resemble arbitration versus
mediation or vice versa, this Articles focuses on arbitration as described. See infra note 4.
4. There is some debate about whether the term "mandatory" appropriately addresses how
arbitration occurs, at least in the consumer setting. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:
Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1632 n.1 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration] (identifying a debate between Professor Jean Sternlight and Professor Stephen Ware on
whether arbitration is really "mandatory" because consumers do have a choice); see also Richard A.
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"employer-mandated," or "pre-dispute" or "compelled" agreements to
arbitrate that have garnered much attention and criticism over the past
twenty years.' The Supreme Court's decisions under the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA")6 since 1991 have overwhelmingly endorsed arbitration' as a
dispute resolution tool to resolve statutory claims, including employment
discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII. Out of the key
Supreme Court cases involving arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination claims since 1991, only one of those decisions still
represents a loss for the employer.9
In 2002, the Supreme Court assessed the importance of the EEOC, the
federal agency charged with enforcing the key statutes that regulate
Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer's Quinceahiera, 81 TUL. L. REV.
331, 333 & n.6 (2006) (capturing the debate between Professors Sternlight and Ware). Regardless of the
potential distinction in what such terms as "mandatory" or "forced" or "employer-mandated" or "pre-
dispute" could mean, when those terms are used within this Article they are all considered synonymous
and representative of arbitration where the employer's effort to require an employee to agree to
arbitration as a condition of employment occurs before the dispute arises.
5. See generally Bales, supra note 4, at 335 (describing the history of enforcement of these
agreements to arbitrate); Richard A. Bales & Mark B. Gerano, Oddball Arbitration, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 405, 405-06 (2013) (referring to broad judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
employment claims); Michael Z. Green, Reading Ricci and Pyett to Deliver Racial Justice Through
Union Arbitration, 87 IND. L.J. 367, 408-12 (2012) [hereinafter Green, Reading Ricci] (referring to
"extremist" viewpoints for and against the Court's broad enforcement of arbitration of employment
disputes); Roger B. Jacobs, Fits and Starts for Mandatory Arbitration, 67 DISP. RESOL. J. 39, 46-52
(2013) (describing the history of enforcement of employment contracts under the FAA); Stemlight,
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4, at 1632-34 (describing the level of criticism of
mandatory arbitration agreements and their expasnive use).
6. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2012).
7. See generally Sara Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act
and the Supreme Court's Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 481-91 (2011)
(describing recent arbitration decisions by the Supreme Court under the FAA); Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts
and Flunks Contracts, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 139-45, 155-58 (2012) (describing
jurisprudence under the FAA); Jeffrey Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation
in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795, 821-81 (2012)
(providing a detailed and critical discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the FAA and its
overwhelming support of arbitration); Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 91, 94-95, 102-07 (2012) (describing judicial
favoring of arbitration); Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L.
REV. 729, 730-31 (2012) ("The Supreme Court's Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) jurisprudence has been,
to put it mildly, much maligned.... [The FAA has arguably been] transformed by the Court into a
source of substantive federal arbitration law that governs and favors the enforcement of virtually every
arbitration agreement entered into in the United States and displaces otherwise applicable state law.").
8. Bales, supra note 4, at 335 (providing an overview of the Supreme Court's enforcement of
arbitration agreements as a condition of employment regarding statutory employment disputes); see
Jacobs, supra note 5, at 46-52 (describing enforcement of employment agreements under the FAA).
9. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002). The other cases, all involving employer
wins, are discussed infra Part I.C-E. But see Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70
(1988) (involving an employer loss). However, a subsequent decision essentially changed the reasoning
in Wright. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (rendering an employer win); see infra Part
I.D.
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workplace discrimination,'o in conjunction with the strong policy of
enforcing arbitration agreements to resolve statutory employment
discrimination claims." In EEOC v. Waffle House, the key issue before the
Court was whether a mandatory arbitration agreement between an employer
and an individual employee precluded the EEOC from pursuing the
employee's charge in court.12 In answering the question, the Court reviewed
policy concerns about the collective public rights that the EEOC must
vindicate through its enforcement policies," and held that the EEOC could
file a lawsuit against an employer and obtain individual relief despite the
existence of an arbitration agreement. 4 The ruling placed the significant
public policy favoring the EEOC as the government agency that eradicates
workplace discrimination ahead of any agreement between an employer and
its individual employees to arbitrate statutory claims." The decision also
addressed whether an agreement to arbitrate limited the EEOC to pursuing
only equitable remedies because the individual employee had agreed to
arbitrate legal relief. The Court held that the EEOC could still pursue all
equitable and legal remedies available under Title VII, including back pay
and reinstatement, along with compensatory and punitive damages.'"
The Supreme Court's acknowledgment in Waffle House of the EEOC's
important role in enforcing employment discrimination laws establishes a
clear, albeit narrow, path to maneuver around the Court's wide endorsement
of mandatory arbitration under the FAA. Because of Waffle House, an
employer cannot completely force arbitration of all statutory employment
discrimination claims with an employee. If the EEOC chooses to pursue
those employment discrimination claims, the employer may still face a jury
trial with the potential for compensatory and punitive damages awards,
despite the employer's attempt to circumvent those options through
mandatory arbitration. As a result of Waffle House, the established
"national policy favoring arbitration" under the FAA gives way to
something else: the policy favoring EEOC vindication of statutory rights
and the Agency's public mandate to protect the anti-discrimination interests
of all employees."
10. See Laws Enforced by EEOC, supra note 2.
11. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 279.
12. Id. at 282.
13. Id. at 285-88.
14. Id. at 292.
15. See id. at 291-92.
16. Id. at 297-98.
17. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1767, 1815 n.287
(2001) ("The underlying tension in Waffle House is between the federal pro-arbitration policy and the
rights of individuals to contract freely with regard to the terms of their employment on one hand, and the
public interest in eradicating employment discrimination on the other" because "[t]he EEOC functions
as more than just an enforcer for individual employee rights against discrimination, it is the watchdog
204 Vol. 35
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This Article's review of several lower court decisions after Waffle
House demonstrates that employers may have responded to that case by
seeking to force arbitration after the EEOC became involved. These
employer responses create a chilling effect that deters employees from
further filing of discrimination charges. Moreover, as this Article asserts,
forcing arbitration in these instances represents an illegal form of
retaliation" that is proscribed by statutory requirements and inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence providing enthusiastic support to
enforcement of retaliation claims.19 This Article examines the use of
retaliation claims to resolve employment discrimination matters as an
effective response to an employer's action to force arbitration as a
purported response to Waffle House. Also, the Article explains how
decisions involving similar retaliation matters filed with the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB"),20 the agency which enforces charges filed
pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),2 1 may also help
employees respond to forced arbitration actions.
In Part I, this Article reviews the Supreme Court's vigorous
enforcement of arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims
under the FAA and related matters regarding the EEOC's policy during that
timeframe. Part II explores the implications from the primary Supreme
Court case, EEOC v. Waffle House, where employee interests prevailed
over the Court's pro-arbitration standards established pursuant to FAA
jurisprudence. In examining lower court decisions since Waffle House, Part
II also exposes employer efforts to circumvent the Court's analysis through
actions to compel employees to arbitrate after a charge with the EEOC has
been filed and how this action retaliates against employees by deterring
them from filing agency charges. Part III considers potential claims to be
developed by agencies, through the courts, and by legislative action in
Congress to combat employer efforts to chill employee filings of charges
for the public's interest" and "the EEOC makes resource allocation decisions about which claims it will
pursue based on its assessment of the most significant impact for workers as a whole.").
18. In this Article, retaliation represents an employer's decision to enforce a mandatory
arbitration policy in a way that forecloses an agency from completely seeking relief for the employee
who filed a charge with the agency. This Article asserts that such retaliation will create a chilling effect
by dissuading employees from filing charges with agencies. Relative to other employees, these employer
actions also send the message that no employees should file charges with agencies because the employer
will seek to prevent the agency from being directly involved in the resolution of those charges by
compelling arbitration.
19. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court's retaliation decisions). Although this
Article focuses on retaliation claims as a tool to challenge forced arbitration, others believe that
Congress may also rectify any harms related to forced arbitration. See, e.g., Art Hinshaw, Sternlight:
Tide Turning a Bit on Mandatory Arbitration Through Recognition that Process Suppresses Claims,
ADR PROF BLOG (Dec. 16, 2003), http://www.indisputably.org/?p=5292 (referring to arguments by
Professor Jean Sternlight that federal legislation in 2014 may bode well for consumers and employees).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012) (discussing the responsibilities of the NLRB).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012).
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with the EEOC and the NLRB by trying to compel arbitration before final
agency action can occur, what this Article terms "retaliatory employment
arbitration."
In Part IV, this Article proposes that the EEOC and NLRB continue to
adopt and enforce clear policies aimed at responding to retaliation from
forced arbitration to achieve sufficient regulation of employer usage of
arbitration. By reference to the terms of a consent order in a case that the
EEOC settled in federal court, the Article's thesis suggests the parameters
that employees may use to frame a retaliation challenge to unfair employer
efforts to force arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims.
Likewise, Part IV discusses a recent NLRB administrative law judge
decision that identifies the parameters in which employees may challenge
retaliation through forced arbitration efforts under labor law. In concluding,
this Article suggests that if agencies and employees are not allowed to
challenge retaliatory employment arbitration, then the public interest in
eradicating discrimination in the workplace, as referenced in Waffle House,
will be diminished.
I.
OVERWHELMING SUPREME COURT ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS TO
ARBITRATE STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
At the dawn of the fiftieth anniversary of Title VII, employees face a
daunting task in trying to challenge agreements for forced arbitration. Legal
changes wrought between 1990 and 2014 explain the development of
arbitration for statutory employment discrimination claims and how this
form of arbitration has become pervasive. A number of circumstances
converged in 1991, namely, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
("CRA of 1991") and the Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp. As a result, that year saw landmark changes in the legal
approach to the arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims.
Thereafter, as detailed in this Part, the FAA's broad enforcement of
arbitration clauses to resolve statutory employment disputes suggests that
there remain almost no real legal options for individual employees who
desire to circumvent forced arbitration.
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.
Before 1991, no employment law practitioner would have thought it
possible that courts would enforce an agreement requiring arbitration of
Vol. 35
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statutory employment discrimination claims.22 Even earlier, when the FAA
was passed in 1925, it is unlikely any "legislator who voted for it expected
it to apply to statutory claims, to form contracts between parties of unequal
bargaining power, or to the arbitration of disputes arising out of the
employment relationship."23 Although this quoted language appears in the
dissenting opinion in the landmark decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., then-Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens captures the
general thinking about arbitration of statutory employment discrimination
claims before 1991.24
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court first authorized the use of arbitration for
resolving a statutory employment discrimination claim. As a condition of
his employment as a financial manager for Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corporation, the plaintiff in Gilmer had to sign a registration application
with the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), which required that he
agree to arbitration over any controversy with his employer." Because he
signed the application with the NYSE containing the arbitration provision,
the plaintiffs employer filed a motion to compel arbitration several years
later, when Gilmer filed a claim against his employer under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").2 6
Pursuant to the FAA, the Supreme Court in Gilmer compelled
arbitration of the ADEA claim. However, the Court refused to answer
whether section I of the FAA, which excludes "contracts of employment"
from FAA coverage, applied to the ADEA claim.27 Because the Court found
that the agreement to arbitrate was not part of a contract of employment
between Gilmer and his employer, but instead an agreement between the
NYSE and Gilmer, it saved for "another day" the resolution of that
question.28 Despite the uncertainty as to whether a direct agreement to
arbitrate between an employer and an employee would be enforceable under
the FAA after Gilmer, employers began to require as a condition of
employment that employees enter into employment agreement requiring
arbitration of all employment disputes. At the urge of employers and with
22. See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage From Using Mandatory
Arbitration For Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 408 & n.26 (2000) [hereinafter Green,
Debunking the Myth].
23. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 42-43 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 23.
26. Id. at 23-24; see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2012).
27. Federal Arbitration Act § 1, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) ("[N]othing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.").
28. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
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the authority of Gilmer behind them, many lower courts enforced those
agreements.29
The CRA of 1991 also helped foster a move to arbitral resolution of
statutory discrimination claims. Shortly after the Gilmer decision in May
1991, President George Herbert Walker Bush signed the CRA of 1991 into
law.30 During its 1988-89 term, the Supreme Court had decided several
controversial cases employment discrimination cases, including Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union," Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,32 Martin v.
Wilks," Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,34 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.35 These decisions, among others, caused concern among civil rights
advocates, who mounted a successful legislative effort to reverse those
decisions."
Under the CRA of 1991, Congress granted employees the right to
pursue compensatory and punitive damages along with the right to a jury
trial for intentional discrimination claims brought under Title VII." These
new remedies were included in the CRA of 1991 to align Title VII claims
with section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ("section 1981")" claims
that already allowed such remedies-but only for employment
discrimination claims based on race.3 9 Because the new statutory regime
now offered jury trials along with punitive and compensatory damages for
certain claims, employers greatly feared that large and unpredictable jury
verdicts would result.40 Accordingly, employers enthusiastically embraced
29. See Green, Debunking the Myth, supra note 22, at 411 n.39, 412 n.42 (citing cases).
30. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Nov. 21, 1991) (codified in
pertinentpart at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1981b (2012)).
31. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
32. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
33. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
34. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
35. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
36. See Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court's Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 281, 285-89 (2011); see also Robert Belton, Title VII at
Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of
Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 431, 467 (2005); Green, Addressing Race
Discrimination, supra note 3, at 949.
37. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 101-02, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 198 lb (2012)) (describing the right to a jury trial made
available to claimants filing for intentional discrimination under Title VII and in particular the right to
compensatory and punitive remedies, which the Civil Rights Act of 1991 limits by capping the total
damages that an employer could recover, starting at $50,000 in damages for employers with fewer than
101 employees and gradually increasing to a total maximum of $500,000 for employers with more than
500 employees).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552-53.
40. See Green, Debunking the Myth, supra note 22, at 422-24, 454-59 (discussing concerns about
nuisance settlement of employment discrimination claims due to unpredictable jury verdicts as a concern
of employers that led to increase of mandatory arbitration); see also Leslie A. Gordon, Clause for
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the use of arbitration after Gilmer by requiring that their employees agree to
arbitrate these and other disputes as a condition of being employed.41
B. The EEOC Response to Gilmer: 1997 Policy Statement on
Mandatory Arbitration
As an initial response to mandatory arbitration, the EEOC issued a
policy statement in 1997 that specifically criticized the use of mandatory
arbitration for employment discrimination claims.4 2 That policy statement
recognized that "[a]n increasing number of employers are requiring as a
condition of employment that applicants and employees give up their right
to pursue employment discrimination claims in court and agree to resolve
their disputes through binding arbitration."43 While remaining "[]mindful of
the case law enforcing specific mandatory arbitration agreements, in
particular, the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane,"44 the EEOC still found "that such agreements are inconsistent with
the civil rights laws."45 In the policy statement, the EEOC ultimately
concluded that mandatory arbitration agreements for employment
discrimination claims should not be enforced.46
Alarm, As Arbitration Costs Rise, In-House Counsel Turn to Mediation or a Combined Approach, 92
A.B.A. J. 19, 19 (Nov. 2006) (stating that arbitration is "[t]raditionally praised for its flexibility,
informality, confidentiality and ability to produce unique awards not available in traditional litigation");
David T. Lopez, Realizing the Promise of Employment Arbitration, 69 TEX. B. J. 862, 862 (2006)
("Employers have opted for mandatory, binding arbitration of employment disputes as a way to avoid
the fear of disproportionate jury awards or jury bias, among other reasons."); Frederick L. Sullivan,
Accepting Evolution in Workplace Justice: The Need for Congress to Mandate Arbitration, 26 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 281, 318 n.224 (2004) ("Much of the advocating for arbitration on the part of employers
results from verdicts that have been pursued before sympathetic-to-employee and hostile-to-employer
juries in proceedings that have become known as workplace lotteries.").
41. Green, Debunking the Myth, supra note 22, at 454-59 (describing employers' concerns about
jury verdicts-albeit based on little data-as leading to the rush to use arbitration). But see Gordon,
supra note 40, at 19-20 (suggesting that some employers are now moving away from arbitration due to
unexpected results and because they see more value in mediation).
42. See Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes as a Condition ofEmployment, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 915.002, at 281-87 (July 10,
1997) [hereinafter EEOC Policy], available at www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html; see also
Joseph D. Garrison, The Employee 's Perspective: Mandatory Binding Arbitration Constitutes Little
More Than A Waiver ofA Worker's Rights, 52 DiSP. RESOL. J. 15 (Fall 1997) (arguing that the EEOC's
position opposing mandatory arbitration was well-deserved); Ellen J. Vargyas, EEOC Explains Its
Decision: Verdict On Mandatory Arbitration In Employment, 52 DIsP. RESOL. J. 8, 10 (Fall 1997)
(referring to further explanation of the EEOC's policy). But cf Beth M. Primm, Comment, A Critical
Look at the EEOC's Policy Against Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 151 (1999).
43. EEOC Policy, supra note 42.
44. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
45. EEOC Policy, supra note 42.
46. See id
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Unfortunately, several more Supreme Court decisions have arisen after
Gilmer47 that further support the use of arbitration for statutory employment
discrimination claims. With questions still lingering about the overall
fairness of mandatory arbitration on Title VII's fiftieth anniversary,48 the
EEOC's continued failure to clarify or amend its 1997 policy statement at
this important time for reflection on the effectiveness of the Agency only
adds to the challenges faced by employees seeking to address workplace
discrimination.49
On March 8, 2011, after drafting a preliminary plan for comprehensive
and retrospective review of its existing rules, the EEOC sought public
comment on the plan and suggestions regarding specific rules that it ought
to include.so In its public comment, the Chamber of Commerce urged repeal
of the EEOC's 1997 Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment." The
AARP and the National Employment Lawyers Association ("NELA")
disagreed.12
On May 24, 2011, after considering public comments in light of certain
legal and operational factors and its available resources, the EEOC
identified five rules for review in its Preliminary Plan for Retrospective
Analysis, none of which addressed its policy on mandatory arbitration." At
the EEOC's July 18, 2012 meeting to discuss its Strategic Enforcement
Plan, NELA submitted a written document that included a November 7,
2011 e-mail attachment arguing that the EEOC should communicate
"immediately to all EEOC offices reaffirming the commitment of the
Commission to implement its 1997 guidance on mandatory pre-dispute
47. See infra Part II.C-E.
48. See Miles B. Farmer, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121
YALE L.J. 2346, 2348 (2012); Stephen A. Plass, Mandatory Arbitration as an Employer's Contractual
Prerogative: The Efficiency Challenge to Equal Employment Opportunity, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 195,
223 (2011); see generally Jean R. Sternlight, Professor, Univ. of Nev., Las Vegas Boyd Sch. of Law,
Testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Federal Arbitration Undermines Enforcement
of Federal Laws by Suppressing Consumers' and Employees' Ability to Bring Claims (Dec. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter Stemlight Testimony], available at
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=congtestimony.
49. See Nancy M. Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC, 63 SMU L. REv. 1237, 1238-39 (2010)
(describing how "[t]he EEOC is an agency that has failed its mission to eradicate discrimination in the
workplace" and referring to "several ways in which the EEOC has not fulfilled its potential").
50. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Preliminary Plan for Retrospective Analysis




53. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Plan for Retrospective Analysis of Existing
Rules, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (July 29, 2011),
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/retro-reviewplan -final.cfm (discussing the lack of an ongoing
plan by the EEOC to update its 1997 policy on mandatory arbitration).
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arbitration to the maximum extent permissible and consistent with current
law."54 However, a lack of action indicates that these efforts fell on deaf
ears.
Even in the year 2014, the EEOC has failed to clarify its policy on
arbitration. Regardless of differences between the courts and the EEOC on
the issue," compliance with employment discrimination law can be
difficults" and employers still tend to look to the EEOC for guidance on
how to comply." Similarly, employees look to the EEOC to help explain
the protections available under the law." Small businesses, lacking the time
and resources needed to challenge the EEOC's position, will likely follow
its guidance in developing compliance policies." In sum, the EEOC's
failure to clarify its position on mandatory arbitration deprives all of these
actors the benefits of their guidance.
54. See Written Testimony of Daniel Kohrman, National Employment Lawyers Association, U.S.
EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-18-12/kohrman.cfm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2014) (including Nov. 7, 2011 e-mail asking the EEOC to reaffirm its 1997 policy to
address "Forced Arbitration").
55. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. REV.
532 (2000) (stressing the importance the courts should give to the EEOC's role in setting policy and the
deference courts should give to the EEOC's interpretations regarding key policy issues); Rebecca
Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the
Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51 (1995).
56. See Jean R. Stemlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment
Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TuL. L. REV. 1401, 1468-82 (2004) [hereinafter
Stemlight, In Search of] (suggesting that the following ten factors make individual employment
discrimination claims difficult to resolve: complex laws, highly contested and confusing facts,
involvement of significant non-legal as well as legal interests, societal need for correct determinations,
societal need for clear and public precedents to guide future conduct and deter future misconduct, the
need for adequate compensation of victims of discrimination, the societal need to punish wrongdoers,
unavailability of a fair procedural mechanism to assert claims, the need for quick resolution of claims to
allow parties to move forward with their lives and business, and that alleged victims tend to have less
resources than the alleged perpetrators); Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity,
2002 Wis. L. REV. 277, 277-82 (2002) (noting that workplace inequities are becoming more complex
and moving to a "second generation" requiring unique collaborative problem-solving skills).
57. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1937, 1953-54 (2006) (highlighting the complexities of the statutes that the EEOC administers;
asserting how the EEOC developed necessary expertise on various related subjects involved in
enforcement; and describing numerous policy guidance materials that the EEOC generates
commensurate with its responsibility to track tendencies and be a "repository for a wealth of information
about the discrimination-related trends and concerns in workplaces around the country"); Primm, supra
note 42, at 160 (referring to employer guidance given by the EEOC). The EEOC lists more than twenty
different policies and guidances for employees and employers to consider on its website, including its
policy against mandatory arbitration. See Enforcement Guidances and Related Documents, U.S. EQUAL
EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (April 2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcementguidance.cfm.
58. Hart, supra note 57, at 1953-54 n.95 (highlighting how employees can learn from the many
guidance materials created by the EEOC to help understand some of the complexities of the law).
59. See EEOC Launches Small Business Task Force EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Dec.
15, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-15-ll.cfm (discussing EEOC efforts to reach
out to businesses that are too small to afford lawyers or human resources as a focus for guidance).
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C. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
The Gilmer Court left unanswered whether the FAA made enforceable
arbitration agreements in the employment context.60 Language in section 1
of the FAA appeared to support the argument that "contracts of
employment" were excluded from the FAA's scope." Accordingly, for a
decade after Gilmer, judges and scholars debated whether the Court's
increasingly strong endorsement of arbitration encompassed agreements
entered into directly between employers and employees.
The Court's 2001 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams decision
answered that question, and made very clear that agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes are enforceable.63 In Circuit City, the employee
alleged discrimination and unfair treatment under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act and state tort law.64 The employer sought to
compel arbitration under a forced arbitration agreement." The Court
specifically held that section 1 of the FAA, which excludes from
enforcement certain "contracts of employment," only applied to contracts of
employees who are transportation workers. 6 The Court based its conclusion
on its interpretation of language related to "workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce."6
As a result of Circuit City, only a very narrow group of employees,
those who literally work in commerce, would have their contracts of
employment exempted from FAA coverage. Since the Gilmer decision, the
Supreme Court has generally supported and endorsed the arbitration of all
forms of agreements, including many not involving employment
discrimination matters.68 But Circuit City provided to date the strongest
60. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (describing how the
arbitration agreement was not part of the employment contract because Gilmer had agreed to arbitrate
with the NYSE and not with his employer).
61. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
62. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
63. See id. at 119.
64. Id. at 110.
65. Id at 105.
66. Id at 119.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012);
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012); Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard,
133 S. Ct. 500 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Granite Rock Co.
v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010); Rent-A-Center W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63
(2010); Stolt Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009); Preston v. Ferrer,
552 U.S. 346 (2008); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Pacificare Health Sys., Inc.
v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); EEOC v.
Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. 105(2001); Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001); E. Ass'n. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers
212 Vol. 35
RETALIATORY EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
authority to use when employers seek to force their employees into
arbitration agreements as a condition of employment.
D. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett
Several years later, in 2009, the Supreme Court decided 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett,69 where it held that a collective bargaining agreement
("CBA") may waive an individual employee's statutory rights to pursue age
discrimination claims in court.70 The Pyett plaintiffs were three union
members, all over forty years of age, who sued their employer for age
discrimination after being reassigned to less desirable and lower paying
jobs.7 The union initially pursued the age discrimination claims on behalf
of the employees as grievances through the CBA's preliminary dispute
resolution procedures. However, the union declined to pursue arbitration of
the claims when the grievance process failed because the union concluded
that the claims lacked a legitimate basis as the union had agreed with the
employer to make the reassignments in question.7 2
In considering whether to enforce the CBA's waiver of judicial
remedy, the Court addressed complex issues that coalesce across various
statutory regimes, including the FAA, the ADEA,74 and the NLRA,"
along with prior Court interpretations of those statutes. Ultimately, the
court held that that the claims could only be pursued through arbitration due
to the CBA's unusually clear language regarding discrimination claims.
of Am., 531 U.S. 57 (2000); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Air Line
Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 70 (1998); Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70
(1998); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Allied-
Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the Supreme Court's
Arbitration Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 10 (2014) (describing many of the arbitration
cases decided by the Supreme Court under the FAA since 1991) (citing Michael L. Rustad et. al, An
Empircal Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service, 34 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643, 684 app. B (2012) (listing most Supreme Court Cases involving
arbitration from 1998 to 2012)).
69. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
70. Id. at 251, 274.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 252-53.
73. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2012).
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012).
76. Pyett, 556 U.S. at 255-60, 266-69.
77. Id. at 252. I consider this language as "unusually clear" because it literally refers to arbitration
as the "sole and exclusive remedy," which is unusual language for a union and an employer to agree to
with respect to a nondiscrimination clause in a collective bargaining agreement. Such unusual language
suggested the parties' intent to waive court access to remedy statutory claims. See id.
2014 213
214 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW
Before Pyett, a strange anomaly existed where an individual employee
with no bargaining power was subjected to mandatory arbitration as a result
of Gilmer while employees represented by a union did not have to agree to
mandatory arbitration. This result had raised questions as to whether an
employer could force individual employees in a union setting to arbitrate
their statutory claims despite the presence of a union." The individual
employees in Pyett were being forced into arbitration by the employer's
argument that it had agreed with the union to arbitrate their claims even
though the union in Pyett had refused to pursue the individual employees'
age discrimination claims in arbitration. The Pyett case represents another
remarkable example of how the Supreme Court has enforced employer
efforts to force individual employees to arbitrate their statutory claims
rather than pursue those claims in court. In denying access to the courts for
employment discrimination plaintiffs, the Pyett Court ruled that a waiver of
an individual employee's right to pursue claims in court must be clear and
unmistakable, and can be achieved by a union's explicit agreement in the
CBA to resolve those claims under the CBA's labor arbitration process."
Despite its precarious reasoning,o Pyett is wonderful in illuminating
the Court's pro-arbitration stance over the last two decades. The decision
underscores the very real removal of judicial involvement in the resolution
of statutory discrimination claims. The Court, in fact, declined to consider
the "speculation" that the decision would insulate a union's failure to
pursue arbitration of an individual's discrimination claim,"' thereby robbing
employees of every forum or just resulting in another way in which
individual employees, such as the plaintiffs in Pyett, are forced to arbitrate
employment discrimination claims. This potential result, among others,
remains a key concern after Pyett.82
78. See Michael Z. Green, Opposing Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining Power in
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
77, 85-86 (2003) (discussing the "anomaly" in broad bargaining power protections for union employees
against enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements and no protection for non-union employees and how
employers sought to force individual employees in the union setting into pursuing arbitration of statutory
claims separate from labor arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement).
79. 556 U.S. at 260.
80. For example, in my 2012 review of Pyett, I asserted that the decision was part and parcel of a
plan to circumvent without overruling thirty-five years of precedent. See Green, Reading Ricci, supra
note 5, at 392-93.
81. Pyett, 556 U.S. at 273-74 ("Respondents also argue that the CBA operates as a substantive
waiver of their [statutory] rights because it not only precludes a federal lawsuit, but also allows the
Union to block arbitration of these claims. . . . [W]e are not positioned to resolve in the first instance
whether the CBA allows the Union to prevent respondents from effectively vindicating their federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum ..... [as] [rlesolution of this question at this juncture would be
particularly inappropriate in light of our hesitation to invalidate arbitration agreements on the basis of
speculation.") (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)).
82. Justice David Souter asserted that the Pyett decision may have no impact due to its failure to
address this concern: "On one level, the majority opinion may have little effect, for it explicitly reserves
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E. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson," the Supreme Court added to
a long line of precedent favoring the enforcement of pre-dispute agreements
to arbitrate employment discrimination claims. The Jackson decision
considered whether the court or the arbitrator rules on challenges to
arbitration agreements as unconscionable, when the arbitrator obtains his or
her authority to decide from the agreement itself. The Supreme Court held
that the arbitrator makes the decision if the agreement so provides.84
The arbitration agreement at issue provided for "arbitration of all 'past,
present or future' disputes arising out of Jackson's employment with Rent-
A-Center, including 'claims for discrimination' and 'claims for violation of
any federal . .. law.""' The agreement also included a delegation provision
stating that the "[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or
agency, shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to
the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this
Agreement, including, but not limited to any claim that all or part of this
Agreement is void or voidable."" Before the Court, Jackson claimed that
the question whether a CBA's waiver of a judicial forum is enforceable when the union controls access
to and presentation of employees' claims in arbitration . .. which is usually the case . . .. " Pyett, 556
U.S. at 285 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). This concern may not ever be addressed
by the Court because the association representing the employer and the union representing the
employees in Pyett have entered into a private agreement, a "Post-Pyett Protocol," that focuses on
mediation and arbitration of any disputes and requires that both parties will not seek a court resolution
regarding the application of the arbitration clause when the union decides to not pursue a discrimination
claim in arbitration. See Terry Meginniss & Paul Salvatore, Response to an Unresolved Issue from
Pyett: The NYC Real Estate Industry Protocol in THE CHALLENGE FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 6 5T" ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, Ch. 11, at 11-7-
11-10 (Michael Z. Green ed., 2013) (providing the specific details of the parties' Post-Pyett Protocol).
While I applaud the efforts of the employer and the union in Pyett to find ways that work for them in
resolving statutory employment discrimination claims through mediation and arbitration under their
Post-Pyett Protocol, I also have concerns about how an individual's statutory claim will be handled
when the union chooses to not pursue the claim in arbitration. See Michael Z. Green, A Post-Pyett
Collective Bargaining Agreement to Arbitrate Statutory Discrimination Claims: What is it Good For?
Could it be Absolutely Nothing or Really Something? in THE CHALLENGE FOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 65 " ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR,
supra, at Ch. 12, 12-11 (criticizing the Post-Pyett Protocol for not providing for full vindication of an
employee's claim in court when the union chooses to not pursue the claim in arbitration and asserting
that the "Protocol appears to agree to something that was not clearly required after Pyett and may even
end up in supporting an argument that [the union] has agreed to waive an individual employee's right to
pursue statutory claims in in court when [the union] has declined to pursue the claim"). Further and
consistent with the concerns expressed in this Article about forced arbitration dissuading employees
from filing claims, the parties to the Post-Pyett Protocol have acknowledged what I consider to be an
unacceptable consequence of their agreement: instead of processing employee claims filed with agencies
and courts, those entities have deferred resolution of those claims to be handled by the Protocol's forced
individual employment arbitration process. See Meginniss & Salvatore, supra, at 11-5.
83. 561 U.S. 63, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
84. 130 S. Ct. at 2779.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2776.
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the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable because it was unconscionable
under state law. Rent-A-Center argued that the arbitrator must decide the
issue, and pointed to the delegation provision for support.
The Supreme Court ruled that, because the parties had clearly and
unmistakably delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and
Jackson had failed specifically to challenge the validity of that delegation
provision, the unconscionability issue must be put to the arbitrator." The
Court reasoned that the delegation provision was "an agreement to arbitrate
threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement" and "simply an
additional, antecedent agreement" to arbitrate challenges to the overall
arbitration agreement." Thus, the delegation provision could be severed
from the overall agreement to arbitrate and may only be displaced by a
specific challenge. Otherwise, the provision remained in effect and left the
validity of the whole arbitration agreement to the arbitrator.
In a dissenting opinion, his last challenge to the Court's expansive
treatment of arbitration under the FAA before his retirement, Justice
Stevens argued that the majority erred in its severability analysis, and
asserted that the Court should have addressed Jackson's unconscionability
challenge to the overall arbitration agreement. He criticized the Court for
adding "a new layer of severability-something akin to Russian nesting
dolls," by deciding to "pluck from a potentially invalid arbitration
agreement even narrower provisions that refer particular arbitrability
disputes to an arbitrator."" Justice Stevens also argued that this "new layer"
erroneously carved out a court's responsibility to decide whether an
agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable before sending any matters to
the arbitrator.90
The Jackson decision, as with Pyett,9 1 strongly supports the continued
application of mandatory arbitration agreements to resolve statutory
employment discrimination claims. Combined with earlier precedents like
Gilmer and Circuit City, and the EEOC's hesitance to get involved in a
meaningful way, forced arbitration provisions increasingly curtail employee
access to the courts, often as a condition of employment. The Jackson
decision's endorsement of removing judicial consideration at the outset of
general contract defenses-such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability-
that would defeat enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate statutory
discrimination claims underscores that, today, employees facing forced
arbitration have few places to turn.
87. Id. at 2779-81.
88. Id. at 2777.
89. Id. at 2786.
90. Id




EMPLOYER EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT WAFFLE HOUSE AS RETALIATION
In representing one of the key chinks in the FAA's armor, the Waffle
House decision seems to have rankled employers as they seek to tighten the
vise grip they hold on mandatory arbitration of employee statutory disputes.
In a review of mandatory arbitration five years after Waffle House, I argued
that the EEOC had erred by failing to develop a coherent update to its
arbitration policy in light of the powerful opportunity presented by the
Court's decision.92 At that time, the promise of Waffle House was still
considered a significant check on employer exuberance for forced
arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims.93 As many
speculated, the EEOC's inability to pursue more than a small percentage of
charges filed as court claims suggests that Waffle House may have had very
little impact.94 Yet, with a change in the enforcement regime-signaled by
Barack Obama assuming the Presidency in 2009-one would have hoped
that the EEOC would finally update its arbitration policy as part of an
overall enforcement regime that captured the broad implications of the
Waffle House decision." Unfortunately, however, the EEOC has remained
silent. Absent any update to its official arbitration policy, a limited number
of cases discussing EEOC action involving an arbitration agreement
provide the only indications of whether Waffle House still offers some hope
for employees seeking to avoid forced arbitration. Those cases suggest that
employers have adopted a clear response to the Waffle House decision:
taking preemptive steps to limit the prospect of litigation by forcing the
92. See Michael Z. Green, Ruminations About the EEOC's Policy Regarding Arbitration, 11
EMP. RTS. EMP. POL'Y J. 154 (2007).
93. See Marc A. Altenbemt, Note, Will EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. Signal the Beginning of the
End for Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Context?, 3 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. J. 221,
250 (2003) (suggesting the decision "may signal a trend that retreats from the general acceptance felt for
mandatory arbitration" because of the "slight contraction" of the Court's broad endorsement of
arbitration and a recognition that "employment discrimination claims" should now be treated "different
from other claims"); Jason A. McNiel, Note, The Implications ofEEOC v. Waffle House: Do Settlement
and Waiver Agreements Affect the EEOC's Right To Seek and Obtain Victim-Specific Relief, 38 IND. L.
REV. 761, 786 (2005) (discussing the potential impact of Waffle House on agreements to arbitrate and
settlement agreements).
94. See Chad Egan Burton, EEOC v. Waffle House: Employers Win, Again, 71 DEF. COUNS. J.
52, 52 (2004) (asserting that Waffle House is a "hollow" victory because the EEOC files only a small
percentage of cases and the "likelihood of a lawsuit); David H. Gibbs, ADR After Waffle House,
Arbitration Gets New Trilogy of Employment Law, 20 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 17, 22 (Feb.
2002) (referring to a "minuscule number of cases brought by the EEOC" in assessing the impact of
Waffle House). One commentator recently noted that out of 99,922 charges of discrimination filed with
the EEOC in 2010, the EEOC filed only 271 suits. See J. Scott Pritchard, Comment, The Hidden Costs
of Pleading Plausibility: Examining The Impact of Twombly and Iqbal on Employment Discrimination
Complaints and the EEOC's Litigation and Mediation Efforts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 757, 769 (2011).
95. See Green, Reading Ricci, supra note 5, at 370 n. 12 (discussing how many had hoped for the
pursuit of an aggressive pro-employee legislative agenda during the Obama presidency and how delays
and politics have prevented those pursuits).
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employee involved to arbitrate before the EEOC can take any official
action."
In an era where the EEOC has been limited by politics, it is perhaps
unsurprising that the Agency has sent mixed messages as to the precise
content of its arbitration policy. Nevertheless, despite the uncertainty, the
possibility of using retaliation claims to circumvent forced arbitration has
been lurking in the background since at least 2004. In that year, the Ninth
Circuit held in EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps97 that an
agreement to arbitrate was valid pursuant to Circuit City, but it remanded
the case to the trial court to address the EEOC's "novel" claim that the
employer had retaliated by refusing to hire a job candidate who would not
agree to arbitration as a condition of employment." Rather than pursuing
the theory further, the EEOC supported a settlement agreement that allowed
a law firm to continue to enforce its mandatory arbitration policy. When
commenting on the eventual settlement of Luce, a spokesperson for the
EEOC admitted that the EEOC's 1997 policy was "still technically in
effect," but that there was "a lot of confusion" at the Agency about how the
policy applied. 99
Accordingly, the EEOC bypassed a chance to establish this "novel"
retaliation theory. This may owe only to political circumstances at that time.
Cliff Palefsky, the attorney representing the plaintiff in Luce, asserted that
the EEOC's decision to settle the case instead of pursuing its "novel"
retaliation claim in the district court was a "political one."'o Supporting
Palefsky's claim was the fact that the EEOC Chair, a Republican appointee,
ignored a letter by Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy and six other
Democrats asking that the EEOC not drop the case after it was remanded.'o
Some of the political heat on the EEOC was ameliorated because the
ultimate decision to settle was not presented directly to the EEOC as the
EEOC's General Counsel acted independently in making the decision.'o2
As the EEOC has not again pursued the retaliation theory of
arbitration, one reading of these circumstances-supported by its settlement
96. See infra Part II.B.L
97. 345 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
98. For further discussion of the possible "novel" claim of retaliation from Luce, see Kiran
Dosanjh Zucker, Retrieving What Was Luce: Why Courts Should Recognize Employees' Refusal of an
Employer's Mandatory Arbitration Agreement As "Protected Activity" Under Title VII's Antiretaliation
Provision, 22 LAB. LAW. 233, 244-49 (2006).
99. See Nancy Montwieler, EEOC Accord Puts Its Stamp ofApproval On Law Firm 's Mandatory
Arbitration Plan, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 132, at AA-1 (July 12, 2004).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id Cliff Palefksy has continued to pursue this retaliation theory by recently filing a complaint
alleging that when an employee filed a charge of discrimination under the ADA, his employer attempted
to force arbitration of that charge as retaliation. See Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-
04487 (N.D. Ca. Sep. 27, 2013) (copy of complaint on file with author).
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action-is that the EEOC now endorses employer-mandated arbitration, or
does not consider efforts to compel arbitration as retaliatory. If this is the
true result, the broader potential impact of Waffle House remains
completely diffused by EEOC inaction. But the stronger possibility is that,
given the political considerations, the EEOC has decided to challenge
mandatory arbitration as a form of retaliation in court actions without
adopting an express arbitration policy or expressly arguing the retaliation
theory espoused by this Article. A review of cases adjudicated after Waffle
House featuring EEOC involvement demonstrates that, even where
arbitration agreements are present, the EEOC is clearly focused on pursuing
discrimination claims in court.
These cases also reveal that, although Waffle House allows the EEOC
to seek victim-specific relief despite the existence of an individual
agreement to arbitrate, whether employers may compel arbitration where
the EEOC has taken the case remains an open question."o' Indeed,
employers are seeking to compel arbitration with individual employees with
some success.'04 The employer's strategy in many of these cases-really, an
attempt to effectuate res judicata-essentially arises from language in the
Waffle House decision stating that "ordinary principles of res judicata, [and]
mootness" may still apply."0 ' By compelling individual employees to
arbitrate before the EEOC can complete its proceedings and obtain court
relief, the employer can assert that any relief won by the EEOC pursuant to
Waffle House has been precluded due to the arbitration result.
Judicial response to these arguments varies. Some courts reject the
employer's attempts to compel arbitration by discussing the various
problems that arise from the conclusion that arbitration of the employee's
claim must be compelled.o' Other courts focus only on the EEOC's right to
103. McNiel, supra note 93, at 775.
104. See Matthew Kane, A Crack in the Waffle House Armor: U.S. Court of Appeals Holds
Employers Can Enforce Arbitration Agreements Against Employees Who Intervene in EEOC
Enforcement Actions, MCGUIREWOODS NEWSLETTER (McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, Va.), Mar. 7,
2007, available at http://www.lorman.com/newsletters/article.php?articleid=680&newsletterid=148
(providing suggestion from management law firm that "even after the Supreme Court's decision in
Waffle House, having arbitration agreements with employees for employment-related claims can have
strategic value for employers in EEOC enforcement actions" while referring to a case in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that allowed the employer to require that an employee
seeking to intervene in an EEOC action arbitrate his claims even if the EEOC could proceed in court).
105. EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 298 (2002).
106. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ranir, No. 1:10-cv-965, 2012 WL 381339 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2012)
(denying the employer's motion to dismiss an employee's attempt to intervene, and refusing to compel
arbitration where the employee signed an arbitration agreement, filed a charge of discrimination under
the ADA with the EEOC, and attempted to intervene in the EEOC's court action); EEOC v. SWMW
Mgmt., Inc., No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 1097543 (D. Ariz. Apr. 21, 2009) (refusing to
compel arbitration and stay the EEOC's enforcement action when the EEOC brought suit on behalf of
the defendant's former employees on the basis of race and gender discrimination, constructive
discharge, and retaliation; reasoning that the former employees were not parties to this action and,
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pursue claims, consistent with Waffle House, and on allowing the employer
to compel arbitration of the individual employee's claims without allowing
the employee to either intervene in the EEOC court action or stay the
arbitration until the court proceedings have been completed."o7
For example, in EEOC v. Circuit City Stores,'o the Sixth Circuit
addressed the employer's claim that the individual employee must be
compelled to seek exclusive relief in arbitration because the employee had
signed an agreement to arbitrate, notwithstanding that the EEOC alone had
filed the lawsuit. The EEOC disagreed, arguing that only the signatory
employee, and not the EEOC, agreed to forego a judicial resolution.' The
court ruled in favor of the EEOC, rejecting the employer's argument as
"6unpersuasive.""o Specifically, the court held that that it and the district
court lacked jurisdiction over Circuit City's motion to compel arbitration,
brought in a separate suit filed against the employee by Circuit City for that
sole purpose, because the employee was not seeking to bring an individual
claim.'" Hence, there was no case or controversy in that suit and the district
court had properly granted judgment on the pleadings." 2 That the EEOC
had filed the lawsuit, not the employee"' in the end made all the difference.
Several lower court cases support the EEOC v. Circuit City Stores
result-that the EEOC may pursue an action even if the employee earlier
agreed to arbitrate, and have even suggested that compelled arbitration is
pursuant to Waffle House, the court may not stay the proceedings and could not order a stay even if
some of the former employees had intervened); EEOC v. Taco Bell of Am., Inc., No. 8:06-cv-1792-T-
30MAP, 2007 WL 809660 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2007) (refusing to compel arbitration when the EEOC
brought suit against Taco Bell, which sought to compel the EEOC to arbitrate, because the EEOC was
not a party to the arbitration agreement and the EEOC had not yet issued a "Right to Sue" letter to the
charging party; holding that the charging party had no jurisdiction and should not be compelled to
arbitrate); EEOC v. GMRI, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 562 (D. Kan. 2004) (finding employee who filed charge
could intervene in EEOC's suit for sex discrimination and rejecting employer's argument that the
charging party's complaints must be resolved through arbitration).
107. EEOC v. Cheesecake Factory, Inc., No. CV 08-1207-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 1259359 (D.
Ariz. May 6, 2009) (compelling arbitration and staying individual's trial to allow arbitration where the
EEOC had filed a suit on behalf of the charging parties under a sexual discrimination claim, but
charging parties had signed an arbitration agreement with their employer); EEOC v. Hooters of Am.,
Inc., No. 06-CV-6138CJS, 2007 WL 64163 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2007) (granting employer's motion to
compel arbitration of intervenor's action where the EEOC filed an ADA discrimination claim based on
plaintiffs charge, but allowing the EEOC to proceed independently, as allowed under Waffle House);
see also EEOC v. Fry's Elecs., Inc., No. C1O-1562RSL, 2011 WL 666328 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2011)
(finding that once an employee intervenes, the employer may seek to compel arbitration even though the
court granted the motion of the employee to intervene and denied the employer's motion to compel
arbitration and motion to stay because of the need to first resolve a factual dispute about whether the
employee had agreed to arbitrate).
108. 285 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2002).






not required once the EEOC files suit.114 In EEOC v. Physicians Services,"s
for example, the court denied the employer's motion to compel arbitration
in a suit involving the EEOC. The employer moved to compel arbitration
and stay the court proceedings pending the resolution of claims in
arbitration on the argument that the instant proceeding would be inefficient
as all matters would be resolved in arbitration. By contrast, the EEOC
argued that its court proceeding should not be stayed even if the arbitration
proceedings went forward. Relying on Waffle House and other cases, the
EEOC argued that its suit existed independently of the arbitration claims
because the suit would be seeking vindication of the public interest."'
The court accepted the EEOC's position. It explained that the "Waffle
House Court did not address [the] specific question of whether an
intervening plaintiff must arbitrate his or her claims pursuant to an
arbitration agreement because the aggrieved party in Waffle House never
intervened in the EEOC's action.""' According to the Court's analysis of
Waffle House, "the majority in Waffle House was aware of the dissent's
objection to the EEOC doing on behalf of an employee that which an
employee has agreed not to do for himself and noted that the Waffle House
Court accepted that consequence of its ruling.""' As a result, the court
denied the motion to compel arbitration."'
The Eighth Circuit reached a contrary result in EEOC v. Woodmen of
the World Life Insurance Society.'20 There, the court addressed a motion by
the employer to compel arbitration of an employee's individual Title VII
claims, as well as her cross-claims filed as an intervenor in a lawsuit filed
by the EEOC in that action. The district court, which had allowed
intervention, denied the employer's motion to stay the cross-claims and
compel arbitration."' The district court supported that result because the
employee "could not afford arbitration"; arbitration here "would interfere
with the EEOC's ability to pursue its interests on behalf of the public"; and
the employee had filed for bankruptcy.'2 2
The Eight Circuit reversed and compelled arbitration. First, because the
bankruptcy court lifted the bankruptcy stay on the Title VII proceedings,
114. See supra note 107 (citing cases).
115. 425 F. Supp. 2d 859 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
116. Id. at 861-62.
117. Id. at 861.
118. Id.
119. Id.; see also EEOC v. Riverview Animal Clinic, 761 F. Supp.2d 1296, 1305 (N.D. Ala. 2010)
(pregnancy discrimination case where employer argued that the claim was subject to arbitration and the
court dismissed and allowed the EEOC to proceed under Waffle House without addressing whether an
employee could intervene or had to arbitrate claim even if the EEOC did not have to arbitrate).
120. 479 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 2007).
121. Id. at 563-64.
122. Id. at 564.
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the court considered the district court bankruptcy concern alleviated.123
Second, the employer's offer to pay for the arbitrator's costs ameliorated
any concern with expense.124 Also, the court found no limitation on the
EEOC's ability to pursue interests on behalf of the public through an
enforcement action if the employee were required to arbitrate her claims.125
Further, the court found that the Supreme Court's caveat in Waffle House
that "[i]t is an open question whether a settlement or arbitration judgment
would affect the validity of the EEOC's claim or the character of relief the
EEOC may seek" suggested that the Supreme Court had not "intended to
preclude an employee from asserting claims in arbitration against the
employer concurrently with the EEOC enforcement action."l26
As with the competing line of cases, lower courts have followed the
Eight Circuit's approach and compelled arbitration after an employer's
motion, even though the EEOC had filed suit. For example, in EEOC v.
Rappaport, Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C.,1 27 the court compelled
arbitration of the employee's claims, and stayed the employee's claims as
an intervenor in the court action while allowing the EEOC to proceed with
its court action.'28 In so ruling, the court disagreed with the EEOC's
argument that "requiring [an employee] to arbitrate her [or his] claims
interferes with the EEOC's right to enforce the law."129
In short, the results from these post-Waffle House cases show the
extent to which employees may be discouraged from filing EEOC charges
if employers seek to compel arbitration while a charge is still pending with
and unresolved by the EEOC. By attempting to compel arbitration before
the EEOC has completed its process, the employer is seeking to prevent the
employee from benefitting from the EEOC's investigation and potential
independent lawsuit. These employer efforts send a message to employees
that the filing of the charge was useless and the employee, by being
compelled to arbitrate, sits in the exact same position as he or she would
have been had no charge been filed. As a result, immediately compelling
arbitration before the EEOC can complete its process, dissuades employees
from even filing a charge. Why file a charge if the employer will be able to
immediately force the employee to arbitrate? Accordingly, the EEOC
should be more concerned about this type of retaliation where employers
send a message to employees that the only benefit of having filed a charge
is that the employer will aggressively seek to arbitrate and attempt to cut the
123. Id. at 561 n.1.
124. Id at 566-67.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 569-70 (citing EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 296, 297 (2002)).
127. 273 F. Supp. 2d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
128. Id. at 264-65.
129. Id. at 263.
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employee off from any relief that the EEOC may obtain on behalf of the
employee.
III.
RETALIATION CLAIMS AS THE REMAINING OPTION FOR RESPONDING TO
FORCED ARBITRATION AND SEEKING WORKER FAIRNESS
With the continued growth of mandatory arbitration,130 employees and
their advocates must determine the remaining options for bringing claims.
Retaliation claims offer a viable option not yet rejected by the Supreme
Court. This Part first considers prior actions by the EEOC and the NLRB in
the arbitration context. Specifically, both agencies have already intimated or
expressed that forcing arbitration may deter or prevent employees from
filing charges with those agencies. ' These are the bases for possible
retaliation claims in light of current retaliation jurisprudence, which this
Part next explores.
In light of the concerns identified by the EEOC and the NLRB, the
Supreme Court's strong Title VII retaliation rationale suggests that
employees should attempt to file charges with those agencies and bring
claims in court on the basis that employer efforts to force arbitration are, in
fact, retaliation for protected activity under Title VII and the NLRA. 132
Finally, this Part closes by urging legislative advocacy aimed at Congress,
especially as it continues to discuss amending the FAA to expressly exclude
employment and consumer claims. 3 Adding language that would prevent
the usage of arbitration as a form of retaliation could be included in pending
legislation.
A. Agency Pursuits
Some recent EEOC and NLRB actions may offer options for
employees seeking ammunition in the battle against forced arbitration.
Going forward, both agencies should consider how employers' mandatory
arbitration policies, as well as their efforts to compel arbitration while
130. See Katherine V. W. Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and
Arbitration Under the Labor Law, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 164 (2013) ("[A] study of the most
prominent firms in the telecommunications, credit, and financial services industries found that nearly 93
percent of these businesses routinely insert arbitration clauses into their employment contracts.") (citing
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study ofArbitration Clauses in
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 886 (2008)).
131. See infra Part II.A.
132. See infra Part II.B.
133. See Hinshaw, supra note 19 (discussing Professor Jean Stemlight's views on possible
legislation); Sternlight Testimony, supra note 48 (testimony given to U.S. Senate Committee by
Professor Jean Sternlight advocating for future legislation); see also infra Part III.A.
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charges are still pending, can represent a form of retaliation in deterring
employees from filing charges.
1. Forcing Arbitration as Interference with Filing EEOC Charges
Employees with claims under Title VII, asserting that they have been
aggrieved because of employment discrimination, must file a charge in
writing with the EEOC to exhaust administrative remedies.' 34 Employees
may also file charges with state fair employment agencies where those
agencies exist.'35 In those cases where the EEOC proceeds to a "cause"
finding, the agency tries to "conciliate" or settle the charge with the
employer. If no resolution is achieved, the EEOC may choose to file a
lawsuit on behalf of the charging party.'3 6 The charging party has the right
to retain her own lawyer and intervene in the EEOC's lawsuit.'
The fiftieth anniversary of Title VII is the right time for the EEOC to
analyze the pending legal issues that may affect employees' abilities to
vindicate their statutory employment discrimination claims through the
arbitration process,' and consider what more it might do in effecting its
purpose. This Article asserts that the EEOC should adopt an aggressive
policy of pursuing retaliation claims when employers seek to compel
employees to arbitrate their statutory discrimination dispute even though the
EEOC is still involved in the matter, so as not to dissuade workers from
pursuing charges that might be brought under Waffle House.' As a start,
the EEOC could update its 1997 arbitration policy to take the position that
when an employee files a charge of discrimination, the EEOC will consider
actions to compel arbitration with the employee as intended to be a form of
retaliation by creating a chilling effect that will deter employees from filing
charges with the EEOC. A cease and desist order would be the most likely
remedy for such behavior if no other actions have been taken other than an
attempt to compel arbitration.
Taking into account the broad standards for establishing retaliation
when an employer dissuades a reasonable employee from filling a charge,
the EEOC has an opportunity to effectuate the policy from Waffle House by
not allowing employers to immediately force arbitration on employees who
file EEOC charges. Then employers cannot attempt to create a res judicata
134. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.7-1601.12 (2010).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (2010).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2010).
137. A charging party may also obtain a right to sue letter and file suit in federal court first. In that
instance, the EEOC may then intervene in the private lawsuit.
138. See Hart, supra note 57, at 1950 ("EEOC statements do reflect considered judgment,
informed by expert analysis and research, about application of open-ended or unclear statutory
commands.").
139. See infra Part IV.
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end run around the recovery that the Supreme Court determined was so
important for the individual employee in Waffle House. Further, employees
will not be led to immediately believe that their filing of an EEOC charge
was worthless if they are placed in the same position of facing arbitration as
they would have held without filing the charge. Except now the employer is
trying to force that arbitration to occur immediately.
2. Forcing Arbitration as Interference with Filing Unfair Labor
Practice Charges
Section 7 of the NLRA provides: "[e]mployees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. . . .""4 Under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, it is
an unfair labor practice that can be prosecuted by the NLRB if an employer
acts to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7."l.41 Section 7 of the NLRA has no temporal
limitations. It applies when a union is engaged in an organizing campaign;
when a union is the collective bargaining representative of the employees;
and also when there is no union present at all. 142
Given the limited number of employees who work in a union setting,
the application of Section 7 to the non-union workplace represents an
important right for all workers. Non-union employers are just starting to see
the significance of Section 7 of the NLRA in their workplaces. The NLRB
has started to examine various employer policies to determine whether they
may chill employees in exercising their Section 7 right to mutual aid or
protection.143 To the extent an employer seeks to enforce a mandatory
arbitration policy that is invalid under the NLRA for chilling employees in
their exercise of their Section 7 rights, an employer may also violate the
NLRA's retaliation provision, Section 8(a)(4), which provides that an
140. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
142. See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile:
Problems With Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2024 (2009)
("Section 7 could be read as providing general antiretaliation protection for all forms of worker activism,
so long as the activism is 'concerted' and for 'mutual aid or protection."'). An employer may not
retaliate against an employee for exercising the right to engage in protected concerted activity. Triangle
Elec. Co., 335 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038 (2001); Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984).
143. See James McDonald, Jr., Has the NLRB Outlawed Courtesy?, LAw360 (Oct. 26, 2012),
http://www.law360.com/articles/387035/has-the-nlrb-outlawed-courtesy (referring to comments by
management attorney regarding NLRB decisions that have caused concern for employers); see also
Michael Z. Green, How the NLRB's Light Still Shines on Anti-discrimination Law Fifty Years After Title
VII, 14 NEV. L.J. _ (forthcoming 2014) (describing several NLRB decisions involving non-union
employers where the NLRB examined a broad range of policies to assess whether those policies would
chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights).
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employer commits an unfair labor practice if it chooses: "to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or
given testimony under this Act."l 44
The NLRB made a splash'4 5 into the mandatory arbitration debate in
2012 when it issued its decision in D.R. Horton.146 In that case, the Board
found that employer efforts to compel individual arbitration and prevent
class arbitration hampered employees' abilities to exercise their rights to
concerted activity under section 7 of the NLRA.14 7 The arbitration
agreement, signed by non-union employees, required individual arbitration
and expressly waived the right of employees to seek class arbitration.
Furthermore, the arbitration agreement provided that an arbitrator may not
consolidate employees' claims or otherwise award relief to a "group" or
"class" of employees in a single arbitration proceeding. The NLRB
concluded that the class waiver language "reasonably would lead
employees to believe that they were prohibited from filing charges with the
Board" and thereby chill employees' exercise of their statutory collective
rights, and, moreover, this conclusion did not conflict with the FAA.'48
After the NLRB decision issued, several courts were asked to address
the validity of the decision within their jurisdictions as cases involving
arbitration policies that banned class or collective arbitration were subjected
to challenge in light of D.R. Horton. Many of those courts refused to follow
the NLRB's decision, and so, too, did the Fifth Circuit when it was asked to
review the D.R. Horton decision on appeal in December 2013.149 In
rejecting the NLRB's decision, the court held that the Board's FAA
144. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2012).
145. The splash reflects the important commentaries and court responses to the NLRB's D.R.
Horton case, See Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action
Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013 (2013) (discussing lower court cases
responding to D.R. Horton and asserting that the decision should be affirmed as within the broad powers
given to the NLRB to protect employees involved in concerted activity under the NLRA). Other
commentaries about D.R. Horton indicate the importance of the decision. See, e.g., Craig Becker, The
Continuity of Collective Action and the Isolation of Collective Bargaining: Enforcing Federal Labor
Law in the Obama Administration, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 401 (2012); Adam Klein & Michael
Scimone, Arbitration vs. Labor Law: An Imagined Conflict, in THE CHALLENGE FOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 65'" ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR,
supra note 82, at Ch. 9; Samuel Estreicher & Katherine Huibonhoa, The Board Lacks Authority for its
D.R. Horton Decision, in THE CHALLENGE FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY 
6 5
TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 82, at Ch. 10; Michael D.
Schwartz, A Substantive Right to Class Proceedings: The False Conflict Between the FAA and NLRA,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2945 (2013); Austin Leland Fleishour, "Horton (Helps) A Who?" Playing
Linguistic Hopscotch with the NLRB and Discussing Implications for Employees' Section 7 Rights, 80
TENN. L. REV. 449 (2013).
146. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012), rev'd in part sub nom. D.R. Horton v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344
(5th Cir. 2013).
147. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *17.
148. Id. at *2.
149. D.R. Horton Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 359-362 (5th Cir. 2013).
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analysis was flawed, and failed to accommodate the FAA's broad policy
requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements.5 o
But embedded within its rejection of the Board's decision in D.R.
Horton is a silver lining: namely, the court's statement that arbitration here
"would lead employees to a reasonable belief that they were prohibited
from filing unfair labor practice charges."'"' This recognition affirmed a key
proposition established by prior cases cited in D.R. Horton that certain
employer policies can chill employee exercise of rights including rights
specifically addressed by a mandatory arbitration policy.'
The Board in D.R. Horton had relied on its U-Haul Co. of California'"
decision for that proposition. There, the Board found impermissible
interference with section 7 rights by a broadly worded arbitration policy
that was "reasonably read to require employees to resort to the [employer's]
arbitration procedures instead of filing charges with the board."' The
NLRB in U-Haul was careful to limit its decision "to the specific clause at
issue in this case, which we have determined would be reasonably read to
restrict the filing of unfair labor practice cases with the board.""'
Other Board decisions have also found that mandatory arbitration
policies would violate the NLRA for discouraging employees from filing
unfair labor practice charges including decisions in Supply Technologies,'
Bill's Electric,'7 and 2 Sisters Food Group.'8 Because the Fifth Circuit in
D.R. Horton did not unsettle this understanding, a fair reading is that
arbitration agreements or policies, if not clearly worded to inform
employees that they may still file charges with the NLRB will be in
violation of the NLRA.'59 To protect employees from being forced into
150. Id. at 362.
151. See id at 363.
152. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Arbitration Clause Can't Block NLRB Complaints, A.B.A. J. E-
REPORT, July 14, 2006 (discussing Board finding that mandatory arbitration agreement was unlawful in
its U-Haul decision and examining its impact). Pursuant to U-Haul, once a charge has been filed with
the Board, an employer's action to compel arbitration could violate section 8(a)(4). See U-Haul Co. of
Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 388 (2006); Nicole Cuda Perez, Too Many Arbitrators Do Spoil the Soup:
NLRB Charges Filed By Non-Unionized Employees Should Not Be Subject to Mandatory Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Agreements, 23 LAB. LAW. 285, 296-97 (2008) (arguing that non-union employees who file
unfair labor practices should not be deemed to have waived those charges because of agreements to
arbitrate (citing U-Haul, 347 N.L.R.B. at 376-77) (finding that "the arbitration policy . . . violates the
Act because it would reasonably tend to inhibit employees from filing charges with the Board" and that
"employees could reasonably believe that they are precluded from filing such charges with the Board")).
153. 347 N.L.R.B. at 377.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 378 n.11.
156. 359 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (Dec. 14, 2012).
157. 350 N.L.R.B. 292, 296 (2007).
158. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 168 (Dec. 29, 2011).
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arbitration, the NLRB must continue to enforce its decisions that make it
unlawful to seek to compel enforcement of arbitration agreements that deter
employees from filing NLRB charges.
B. Retaliation Claims in the Courts
The Supreme Court has an interesting history of enforcing retaliation
claims, especially under Chief Justice John Roberts.6 o For example, the
Court has read a broadly worded civil rights statute, section 1981, to
include an anti-retaliation remedy."' In CBOCS West v. Humphries, the
Court held that section 1981 '62-which declares that all persons "shall have
the same right . .. to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white
citizens"-prohibits not only racial discrimination but also retaliation
against those who oppose it.163 In another case, Gdmez-Prez v. Potter,'6 4
the Court likewise read an anti-retaliation remedy component into the broad
wording of the federal-employee provisions of the ADEA.16 5
159. Hudson, supra note 152 (discussing comments of Katherine Stone about possible mandatory
arbitration clauses that may not be a problem, such as the clause at issue in U-Haul); but see Liquita
Lewis Thompson, Arbitrators-Unlike Too Many Cooks-Do Not Spoil the Soup! Making the Case for
Allowing Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration of Unfair Labor Practice Charges in Non-Union
Workforces, 23 LAB. LAW. 301, 314-315 (2008) (arguing that NLRB decisions finding mandatory
arbitration policies which fail to clearly define that an employee is not waiving the right to file an unfair
labor practice charge should not be used to prevent non-union employees from proceeding to
arbitration).
160. See generally Michael Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation Decisions,
60 S.C. L. REv. 917 (2009); David Long-Daniels & Peter N. Hall, Risky Business: Litigating Retaliation
Claims, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 437, 440-42 (2013). Long-Daniels and Hall describe a trio of
Supreme Court cases expanding the scope of retaliation claims: Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co., 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson
County, 555 U.S. 271 (2009); and Thompson v. North American Stainless, L.P., 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
However, the Roberts Court may be losing its affection for retaliation claims. The only key Supreme
Court case decided by the Roberts Court that denied victory for the employee was its most recent
decision, which found that Title VII's retaliation provision is different from the discrimination provision
in Title VII, at least with respect to the standard of causation required. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr.
v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). Retaliation scholars, however, were already predicting that the
Court's support for retaliation claims would soon begin to wane. See, e.g., Alex B. Long, Employment
Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 ORE. L. REv. 525, 526-29 (2011) (noting that going into the
Supreme Court's 2010 term, "nearly every case adopted an interpretation of a statutory antiretaliation
provision that favors employees" while also asserting that these decisions may be "lulling
proponents .. . into a false sense of security" as employees will "start losing" these claims).
161. See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442-53 (2008).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
163. CBOCS, 553 U.S. at 445.
164. 553 U.S. 474 (2008).
165. Id. at 479, 487 ("'All personnel actions affecting [federal] employees ... who are at least 40
years of age ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on age' .... (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
633a(a) (2012)); see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U.S. 167, 173, 179 (2005) (finding
anti-retaliation remedy in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a));
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 235 n.3, 237 (1969) (finding anti-retaliation remedy
in 42 U. S. C. § 1982)).
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The Court's 2006 decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. White 66 evinces a similar pro-employee stance of the Roberts Court
with respect to retaliation. Title VII's express anti-retaliation provision,
section 704(a), prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against" an
employee or job applicant because that individual "opposed any practice"
made unlawful by Title VII, or "made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in" a Title VII proceeding or investigation.' 67 In White, the
Court addressed the type of retaliatory acts covered by section 704(a). 168
As the court explained at the outset, a retaliation claim is broadly
aimed at "prohibiting employer actions that are likely 'to deter victims of
discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,' the courts, and their
employers."' 9 Accordingly, it held "that the anti-retaliation provision does
not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to
employment or occur at the workplace."' A section 704(a) plaintiff must
show that the employer's retaliatory action was "materially adverse" in that
the action would have "dissuade[d] a reasonable person from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination."' The focus is on the "materiality
of the challenged action and the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff s position." 72
In other words, as stated by Justice Breyer, "[c]ontext matters.""' As
an example, the Court reasoned that "[a] supervisor's refusal to invite an
employee to lunch" could be so trivial as to not be actionable, "[b]ut to
retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that
contributes significantly to the employee's professional advancement might
well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about
discrimination." 74
166. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
167. Id. at 56. Section 704(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including
on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor
organization to against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
168. 548 U.S. at 56-57 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)).
169. Id. at 68.
170. Id. at 57.
171. Id. at 68.
172. Id. at 69-70. The materially adverse analysis is not limited to materially adverse changes in
the terms and conditions of employment, such as termination, demotion, and reassignment, among
others. Instead, the question is whether the retaliatory action would be materially adverse to a
reasonable employee.
173. Id. at 69.
174. Id.
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In applying the broad retaliation standard of White to employer efforts
to force arbitration when employees have pending charges before the EEOC
or the NLRB, this approach would seem to yield the conclusion that these
actions would deter reasonable persons from pursuing their statutory rights
to file charges. Employees would have no incentive to file charges if they
would ultimately be compelled to arbitrate their claims. Helpfully, some
federal appeals courts have accepted that compelled, or pursued, arbitration
can chill the exercise of legal rights.
For example, in EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and
Universities,' the Seventh Circuit held that the very language of a CBA
dissuaded employees from pursuing administrative relief in violation of
section 4(d) of the ADEA, which mirrors Title VII's retaliation provision.176
Specifically, the CBA stated: "[i]f .. . while a grievance proceeding is in
progress, an employee seeks resolution of the matter in any other forum,
whether administrative or judicial, the Board or any University shall have
no obligation to ... proceed further with the matter pursuant to this
grievance procedure.""' Because the CBA effectively required an employee
to choose between filing under the grievance process provided or with the
EEOC,"' the language was retaliatory on its face because it penalized the
employee for choosing to file with the EEOC by eliminating the employee's
right to use the internal grievance process.
In Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co.,'79 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
whether illegal retaliation occurred where an employer terminated an
employee for refusing to sign an arbitration agreement offered to the
employee when he had a charge of discrimination pending with the EEOC.
In a prior decision, Weeks v. Harden Manufacturing Corp.,so the court had
ruled that an employee's refusal to sign an arbitration agreement as a
condition of employment upon hiring failed to establish a retaliation claim
because refusing to sign an arbitration agreement was not a protected
activity.'"' Weeks similarly reasoned that terminating employees for their
failure or refusal to sign an arbitration agreement who had not yet filed or
threatened to file EEOC charges could not be retaliation because the
175. 957 F.2d 424 (7th Cir.1992).
176. See Lorne Fienberg, Note, Retaliation Claims Under § 4(d) of the ADEA: EEOC v. Board of
Governors of State Colleges, 34 B.C. L. REV. 413, 413 n.4 (1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988)
and EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir. 1987)).
177. Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 426.
178. Id. at 429-30.
179. 513 F.3d 1261 (1lth Cir. 2008).
180. 291 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2002).
181. Id. at 1316-17.
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"plaintiffs could not have had an objectively reasonable belief that their
refusal was a statutorily protected activity."' 8 2
The Goldsmith court distinguished Weeks, however, on the grounds
that the employee had a pending EEOC charge."' Hence, when the
employer sought the employee's agreement to arbitrate "all past, present,
and future" claims against the employer as a condition of employment, the
employee would have been giving up his ability to pursue his pending
charge with the Agency and making it mandatorily arbitrable.'" Perhaps
influencing the court's conclusion that seeking to compel such arbitration
was retaliatory was the employer's rejection of the employee's request to
limit arbitration to only future disputes.' In any case, Goldsmith provides
further support for the notion that courts recognize the potential of
employer-compelled arbitration to interfere with statutory rights. In joining
the analysis in Goldsmith with the analysis in White, the employee would be
able to receive all rights and remedies as a result of an employer's
retaliatory action of trying to force arbitration when the EEOC was still
involved in handling a discrimination charge.
C. Congressional Reforms
Past congressional efforts to amend the FAA have not been effective,
despite the many calls for legislative action to respond to the growing FAA
Goliath.'86 Despite this lack of legislative success, the ongoing debate about
mandatory arbitration has continued to dovetail with the debate about the
Arbitration Fairness Act ("AFA"), a piece of legislation that has repeatedly
been reintroduced in Congress for the past half-decade and is still now
pending before it.'8 The AFA would make pre-dispute agreements to
182. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1278 (2008) (discussing Weeks, 291 F.3d at
1307).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1271-72.
185. Id.
186. See Cole, supra note 7; Hinshaw, supra note 19; Stemlight Testimony, supra note 48.
187. See, e.g., Hinshaw, supra note 19 (describing "new cause for optimism" in curbing forced
arbitration against a backdrop of the AFA); Sternlight Testimony, supra note 48 (written testimony to
the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in support of passage of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013); Jean
R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J.
82 (2007) (describing arguments for and against a prior version of the Arbitration Fairness Act). For the
current and prior versions of the AFA, see Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong.
(2013) (introduced May 7, 2013, in U.S. Senate as S. 878 by Senator Al Franken (Democrat,
Minnesota) along with 24 cosponsors, and introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as H.R. 1844
by Congressman Henry C. "Hank" Johnson (Democrat, Georgia) along with seventy-one co-sponsors);
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 4181, 112th Cong. (2012) (introduced by Rep. Robert Anderson
(Democrat, New Jersey); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by
Senators Al Franken and Richard Blumenthal (Democrat, Connecticut)); Arbitration Fairness Act of
2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by Congressman Hank Johnson); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009). Congress continues to take additional efforts through annual
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arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims unenforceable. It
would also prohibit enforcement of arbitration provisions in agreements
between unions and employers (as allowed by Pyett) that waive individual
employee rights to pursue claims arising under a statute or the U.S.
Constitution.'
With respect to reforms that ban the enforcement of mandatory
arbitration for certain statutory disputes without directly addressing the
FAA, Congress has already passed legislation. The Franken Amendment to
the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act prevents federal
contractors with a contract of at least $1,000,000 from entering into pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory or tort claims involving sexual
harassment or assault.'89 Also, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act"),' passed by Congress and
signed by President Obama in 2010, bans mandatory arbitration of
retaliation claims by those who report securities fraud, commodities fraud,
or other claims covered by the Dodd-Frank Act's retaliation provisions.' 9 '
Further attempts to ban mandatory arbitration agreements involving
customers and investor disputes may soon be addressed pursuant to the
Dodd-Frank Act. 9 2 The results from both the Franken Amendment and the
Dodd-Frank Act underscore that the severity of the situation has not
completely escaped congressional attention.
hearings to raise discussion about this potential legislation. Bales & Gerano, supra note 5, at 416
(discussing renewed-yet unsuccessful-efforts to have hearings about potential legislation after the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2012 was introduced).
188. H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013) (proposing a new section 402(b) to be added to the FAA
that precludes waivers of individual employee statutory rights or rights under the U.S. Constitution in
collective bargaining agreements).
189. See Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409, 3454-55 (2009).
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (2012).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) (2012).
192. Preliminary results from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, pursuant to Dodd-Frank,
suggest that most large banks use arbitration, small banks use arbitration much less than large banks,
most arbitration clauses include class waivers, and few consumers file claims in arbitration. CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS: SECTION 1028 (A) STUDY RESULTS
TO DATE 12-15 (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb arbitration-study-
preliminary-results.pdf; see Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L.
REv. 1174, 1178 (2010) (describing Dodd-Frank provisions authorizing changes to mandatory
arbitration for financial consumers); Paul Kirgis, CFPB Preliminary Results on Study of Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer Contracts, ADR PROF BLOG (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://www.indisputably.org/?p-5283; Ann Carms, Consumer Agency Looking into Mandatory
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES BUCKS BLOG (Apr. 25, 2012, 2:27 PM),
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/consumer-agency-looking-into-mandatory-arbitration/
(referring to the requirement in section 1028(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act that the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau study and provide a report to Congress about agreements to arbitrate future disputes
with consumers and how the Bureau requests public comments as part of its study); see also Hinshaw,
supra note 19 (referring to Professor Jean Sternlight's assessment of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau report and Paul Kirgis's assessment of activities related to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau's findings on arbitration as support for legislative change).
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As a result, hope springs eternal for those who want Congress to finally
provide protection for employees to rival the effective protection the
Supreme Court has afforded employers who have sought enforcement of
arbitration agreements since 1991. At least one commentator, Professor
Jean Sternlight, remains optimistic that legislative reform will occur in
2014.'93 If the current version of the AFA passes, there will be no need for
employees to assert retaliation claims in response to employer efforts to
force arbitration. Those agreements to arbitrate will no longer be enforced.
However, because President Obama's political party does not have
control of the House of Representatives and lacks a sufficient number of
Senators to prevent legislation from being blocked in committees, passage
of the AFA seems unlikely.19 4 Perhaps, at minimum, Congress could
embrace the opportunity of Waffle House and pass narrower legislation to
ensure that once a charge is filed with either the EEOC or the NRLB, no
party can force arbitration until the agency process is completed.' Such
legislation would stop the retaliatory actions of employers to force
arbitration that have been occurring as a response to Waffle House.
IV.
DEFINING THE PARAMETERS OF RETALIATORY EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION
Employers (and possibly politicians and employer-interest groups)
could easily balk at the notion that their efforts to enforce legal mandatory
arbitration policies by attempting to compel an employee to arbitrate could
result in a successful retaliatory employment arbitration action."' Under the
Supreme Court's broad approach to retaliation in White and the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis in Goldsmith, the central question for a retaliation claim
193. See Hinshaw, supra note 19.
194. See Green, Reading Ricci, supra note 5, at 370 n.12 (describing political difficulties that
derailed the development of employment legislation during President Obama's first term); see also Rona
Kaufman Kitchen, Off-Balance: Obama and the Work-Family Agenda, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y 211,
269-70 (2012) (describing enforcement problems of the EEOC during President Obama's first term and
suggesting this result stems from the EEOC being "stubbornly resistant to change according to
presidential political affiliation"). But see Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice
of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REv. 363, 425-27, 434-35
(2010) (describing how the EEOC has acted more independently as a pro-employee agency due to initial
efforts to limit its enforcement powers and suggesting that the EEOC has been more responsive to
changes by pro-employee special interest groups than to opposing changes posed by presidents or
Congress).
195. As described earlier, narrower legislation aimed at the specific type of disputes that may be
banned from mandatory arbitration rather than attempts to amend the FAA have already successfully
occurred pursuant to the Franken Amendment and the Dodd-Frank Act. See supra notes 192-194 and
accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Weeks v. Harden, 291 F.3d 1307, 1316-17 (llth Cir. 2002) (finding that there is no
valid retaliation claim for an employer's efforts to pursue mandatory agreements to arbitrate, which the
Supreme Court has endorsed as legal activity).
2332014
234 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 35
based on an employer's motion to compel is whether the action would deter
a reasonable person from pursuing his or her right to file a charge of
discrimination. Filing an EEOC charge would, of course, be useless if the
employer could compel arbitration and remove the employee from the
EEOC process. Hence, such an employer action would deter a reasonable
employee from pursuing the EEOC process and therefore satisfies the White
standard. The Waffle House decision refers to the importance of public
interest vindication, and that public interest is harmed when employees are
deterred from filing charges.
Employers may be left wondering what, if anything, they can do to
prevent a retaliatory employment arbitration charge from being
successful.'9 7 The answer to that question is quite straightforward. If a
dispute involves a charge that could be filed with a public agency such as
the EEOC or the NLRB, the employer needs to make sure that employees
are not prohibited from or deterred from filing charges with those agencies
or from participating in those agencies' actions as a result of the employer's
arbitration policy. Also, the employer cannot attempt to force an employee
to arbitrate the dispute when the agency is still involved in reviewing the
matter or has brought a further action to enforce the charge.'98 If the agency
has dismissed the charge and the employee is pursuing the matter
independently, then the employer would have every right to compel
arbitration without raising a concern about retaliation. 199
197. I thank Professor Catherine Fisk for suggesting that a response to the thesis in this Article
may be that employers cannot be subject to retaliation for merely pursuing legal activity to enforce their
valid mandatory arbitration agreements by seeking to compel arbitration. See Bill Johnson Rests., Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (finding that a lawsuit filed cannot result in retaliatory action unless it
is frivolous); BE&K Const. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 530-33 (2002). However, NLRB decisions
have held that the Bill Johnson doctrine does not apply where the objective of the suit is illegal under
federal law independent of its retaliatory intent. As a result, if the NLRB finds that a particular practice
such as an overly broad mandatory arbitration policy is independently illegal under the NLRA, then an
action to compel enforcement of that policy is an exception to Bill Johnson as noted in footnote 5 of that
case. See Bill Johnson, 461 U.S. at 738 n.5 (finding no protection for a law suit that is "illegal under
federal law"). This analysis was described recently by an ALJ decision applying D.R. Horton. See
Neiman Marcus Grp., No. 31-CA-074295, 2014 WL 495797 (NLRB Div. of Judges Feb. 6, 2014).
198. The NLRB has a policy of deferring disputes to be resolved through arbitration under its
longstanding Collyer deferral policy. This policy would not affect the matters discussed here because, in
such actions, the NLRB has decided to resolve the matter by deferring to arbitration instead of the
employee being compelled to arbitrate to prevent the NLRB from pursuing the matter. This Article
concerns the latter activity-retaliatory employment arbitration. Also, in 2012, the NLRB General
Counsel changed the Board's approach to Collyer by first asking whether the dispute could be resolved
within a year and deciding not to defer to arbitration if the matter would not be resolved within that
timeframe. See Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to All Reg'1
Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, NLRB, Concerning Collyer Deferral Where
Grievance-Resolution Process is Subject to Serious Delay, GC 12-01 (Jan. 20, 2012) available at
http://www.crowell.com/files/GC_1201_GuidelineMemorandumConcerning CollyerDeferral.doc[
l].pdf.
199. See, e.g., Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2005) (relying on
EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002), to find that an employer has not waived its right to seek
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EEOC v. Ralph's Grocery Co. 200 is instructive with respect to
developing the parameters of a retaliatory employment arbitration claim. In
bringing such claims, employees and even the EEOC may benefit from
pursuing the rationale employed by the EEOC in that case-and hence,
employers would be wise to learn from it. Likewise, those seeking to bring
such claims should frame their actions to be consistent with the concerns
expressed in that case. Prior to that instant action in Ralph's Grocery, the
employer had unsuccessfully sought in federal court to compel arbitration
and enjoin a state human rights agency investigation of a discrimination
charge filed by a former employee.20' The employer also sought the same
result in a state court and sent the employee a letter indicating that she had
to withdraw her state agency discrimination charge because of the
arbitration agreement.202 She responded by filing a retaliation charge
directly with the EEOC.203
Before the state court ruled, however, the EEOC moved in Ralph's
Grocery to enjoin the state court from granting the employer's motion to
compel and stay the investigation. The EEOC argued that a federal
injunction was appropriate because the employer's actions would "interfere
with an individual's right to file a charge" and "because such state court
action is illegal retaliation that is contrary to public policy."204 The court
accepted the EEOC's argument. It reasoned that the employer's state court
action and motion to compel, which would ultimately stay the state
agency's investigation (conducted in tandem with the EEOC), would create
a "chilling effect on the many employees who . .. have a statutory right to
file a charge with the EEOC or its sister state agencies."205
Tellingly, the EEOC took the position in Ralph's Grocery that the
employer's state court injunction action and motion to compel arbitration
was a form of retaliation against employees for exercising their right to file
a charge.206 In accepting that contention, the court relied on Waffle House to
assert that the agreement to arbitrate could not prohibit the employee from
filing a charge with the EEOC or the equivalent state agency.207 After the
arbitration by waiting until after an EEOC charge has been dismissed and an employee has filed a court
claim to be able to demand arbitration at that time).
200. 300 F. Supp. 2d 637 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
201. Id. at 639.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. David L. Hudson, Jr., Don't Stop Probes of Worker Complaints, EEOC Says, Two Courts
Rule Arbitration Pact Can't Block Agencies' Investigations, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Jan. 30, 2004
(discussing the results in both the state court and the federal court regarding Ralph's Grocery's action
seeking an injunction of the state agency charge investigation).
205. Ralph's, 300 F. Supp. 2d. at 640.
206. Hudson, supra note 204.
207. Id.
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state court injunction proceedings were enjoined, the EEOC filed a
subsequent federal court action208 to pursue the retaliation charge. However,
the parties settled pursuant to a consent decree.2 09 As a result, the case gives
no dispositive authority on the viability of these claims.
Nevertheless, the terms of the consent decree lend support to the
retaliatory employment arbitration theory.210 It established an injunction
against the employer and its employees for "retaliation against any person
because such person has opposed any practice made unlawful under Title
VII. or the ADA, filed a charge ... or coercing an employee who files a
charge." 2 1' The employer agreed to "train employees on filing charges
without retaliation and not use lawyers involved in creating its arbitration
clause."212 Finally, the employer could no longer "maintain an arbitration
agreement that deters or interferes with employees' right to file charges
with the EEOC."2 13
The consent decree terms specified that the employer's arbitration
policy would have to provide specific language in "bold print as a separate
paragraph in a font-size of at least twelve point" the following:
Nothing in this Agreement infringes on an Employee's ability to file a
charge or claim of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission or comparable state or local agencies. These
agencies have the authority to carry out their statutory duties by
investigating the charge, issuing a determination, filing a lawsuit in Federal
or state court in their own name, or taking any other action authorized under
these statutes. Employees retain the right to participate in such action. 214
As a result, the consent agreement terms highlight the importance of
allowing the employee to participate in the EEOC's process including court
actions and suggest that employer efforts to compel arbitration to prevent
the employee from participating would represent unlawful retaliation. The
consent agreement terms from Ralph's Grocery, as well as the way in
which the courts in White and Goldsmith analyzed these issues, provides
208. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, or In the Alternative, to Stay
the Case, EEOC v. Ralph's Grocery Co., No. 1:07CV05110, 2007 WL 5039322 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2007)
(noting that the underlying charge was eventually dismissed by the state agency and addressing the
charge of retaliation that the EEOC filed under the ADA and Title VII in response to the employer's
actions in contacting the employee to compel arbitration after the employee had filed the charge when
the employer argued that enforcement of its arbitration policy justified its contact with the employee).
209. Consent Decree, EEOC v. Ralph's Grocery Co., No. 1:07CV051 10 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2008).
210. See Consent Decree, Ex. B, EEOC v. Ralph's Grocery, No. 1:07CV05110 (N.D. Ill. May 5,
2008).
211. Id. at 2.
212. Id. at 5.
213. Id. at 6.
214. Id. at 12 (original bolding emphasis removed).
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several takeaways for employers facing potential of retaliatory employment
arbitration claims. First, employers should adopt clear language in their
arbitration agreements to inform employees that the employer will not
retaliate against employees for pursuit of EEOC enforcement, as in Ralph's
Grocery. Second, once a dispute becomes known, the employer can offer
arbitration as a voluntary recourse to the employee, rather than waiting for
the employee to file an EEOC charge or waiting for an indication that the
EEOC will be involved in the case. But, if the EEOC becomes involved,
employers should refrain from moving to compel arbitration because it may
lead to a retaliation charge-in addition to the underlying charge of
discrimination. If employers act proactively, they can reduce their own
liability potential while also respecting the rights of their employees and the
EEOC under federal law. However, when employers attempt to force
employees to arbitrate as a means to circumvent an agency's process,
employees should be able to bring a successful claim of retaliatory
employment arbitration.
Likewise, the NLRB's Administrative Law Judge ("AL") decision in
The Neiman Marcus, Group, Inc.2 15 is instructive with respect to actions
that an employee may take to get the NLRB to respond to an employer's
actions to compel arbitration. In Neiman Marcus, the ALJ, following D.R.
Horton, found that an employer's mandatory arbitration policy violated the
NLRA.216 When the employee chose to file a class action lawsuit in state
court against the employer, the employer responded by seeking to compel
arbitration.217 Because the NLRB had clearly held in D.R. Horton that an
arbitration policy banning an employee from pursuing collective arbitration
and also failing to make it clear that employees could file charges with the
NLRB violates the NLRA in coercing employees in the exercise of their
Section 7 rights,2 18 the ALJ ordered as a remedy that the employer rescind
its mandatory arbitration policy and cease and desist from attempting to
enforce that policy by compelling arbitration in the state court
proceeding.219 In another recent ALJ decision in January 2014, the ALJ, in
adhering to D.R. Horton, found that an employer's attempt to file a motion
to compel arbitration in a state court proceeding violated the NLRA when
215. No. 31-CA-074295, 2014 WL 495797 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Feb. 6, 2014) (decision by
NLRB administrative law judge, Eleanor Laws, finding that an employer's attempt to compel
enforcement of its mandatory arbitration policy in state court action brought by employee was an unfair
labor practice and the judge ordered, among other things, that the employer cease and desist from
seeking to enforce its mandatory arbitration policy).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012)).
219. Id.
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based upon an arbitration agreement that was invalid for suggesting to
employees that they could not file charges in Leslie's Poolmart, Inc.220
Although the Ralph's Grocery and Neiman Marcus cases reflect
actions involving two different agencies, the EEOC and the NLRB, the
teaching from these cases is that mandatory arbitration policies that chill
employees from exercising their rights under Title VII and the NLRA by
discouraging the filing of charges represents an ongoing challenge that
employees may pursue. Further, to the extent that an employer attempts to
force an employee to arbitrate the dispute when the agency involved is still
processing the claim, the employee may pursue actions by filing retaliation
charges with those agencies to stop the employer from forcing arbitration.
CONCLUSION
This Article highlights an important and still-developing aspect of the
Supreme Court's Waffle House decision: the potential for retaliation by
employers through compelling arbitration. The EEOC, as the agency
charged with the enforcement of various statutory employment
discrimination laws, must be allowed to pursue its statutory enforcement
process regardless of whether the employee who filed the charge of
discrimination had agreed to arbitrate her statutory discrimination claims.
Although the EEOC rarely takes filed charges to litigation, the EEOC needs
employees to file those charges to accomplish its enforcement objectives.
This Article proposes that once a charge is filed, any attempt to
arbitrate should be tabled until the agency proceedings can proceed as
expected pursuant to the statutes that created those agencies. If the EEOC
dismisses the charge, then the employer may seek to compel arbitration
consistent with the Court's FAA jurisprudence supporting the arbitration of
statutory claims. But as the EEOC investigates and takes the case,
employers who seek to compel arbitration should be deemed as retaliating
against employees under the standard set by White as those actions dissuade
employees from filing charges. In deterring the filing of charges, broader
concerns materialize as legitimate charges that need to be brought to
vindicate strong public interests will not be brought. Likewise, if the
NLRB dismisses the matter or decides to defer to the arbitration process
because it has determined that the arbitration policy involved does not
violate the NLRA, then the employer may go forward with pursuing
arbitration of the dispute.
Importantly, this Article's proposed role for the EEOC-of
investigating and pursuing claims for retaliatory employment arbitration-
comports with the Agency's goal as stated in Waffle House. The EEOC
should not be limited in pursuing its statutory duties and must take every
220. No. 21-CA-102332, 2014 WL 204208 (NLRB Div. of Judges Jan. 17, 2014).
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step to prevent employers from forcing arbitrations that will deter an
employee from even filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The
EEOC can achieve this objective by pursuing retaliatory employment
arbitration claims-whether that pursuit ends in cease-and-desist orders or
full-blown litigation. Likewise, this Article's proposed role for the
NLRB-of continuing to expand upon the goals for managing the fair
enforcement of mandatory arbitration policies within the boundaries of
Section 7 activity and pursuing claims for retaliatory employment
arbitration comports with the goals of NLRB decisions such as U-Haul Co.
of California, Bill's Electric, and Supply Technologies as they were highly
publicized by D.R. Horton, should continue.
As discussed, the Ralph's Grocery consent decree identifies certain
parameters that employees and employers should consider before and after
the filing of an EEOC charge when an agreement to arbitrate is involved.
Employees may be able to circumvent the arbitration agreements if the
employer fails to take safeguards to make sure that employees know that
they can still pursue their EEOC charges despite agreements to arbitrate.
Further, once the employee files a charge, any arbitration process should be
delayed until a final EEOC action has occurred. Regardless, employers are
still free to pursue enforcement of their mandatory arbitration agreements if
the EEOC dismisses the charge. Also, as discussed, the Neiman Marcus
administrative law judge decision suggests certain parameters that
employees and employers should consider before and after the filing of an
NLRB charge when an agreement to arbitrate is involved. Employer failure
to make sure the employees are not coerced in pursuing charges or other
concerted activity under the arbitration policy could open the door to a valid
NLRB charge by an employee seeking to prevent enforcement of the
arbitration policy. Further, once a charge has been filed or when an
employer seeks to compel arbitration of the dispute in some other
jurisdiction without any final approval by the NLRB, an employee may be
able to obtain an NLRB order stopping the employer from attempting to
compel arbitration.
When employers use arbitration policies that make employees
reasonably believe that they cannot bring charges with an agency or when
employers respond to employee charges or other actions by seeking to
compel or force arbitration, these employer efforts result in retaliatory
employment arbitration actions. The chilling effect from retaliatory
employment arbitration efforts that deters or dissuades reasonable
employees from filing charges represents an important public and agency
interest that must be protected despite the ongoing judicial support for
enforcing arbitration agreements. As part of a comprehensive approach to
responding to forced arbitration agreements at the fiftieth anniversary of
Title VII, employees should pursue claims through the EEOC and NLRB
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agencies along with the courts to prevent employers from taking retaliatory
employment arbitration actions while also continuing to seek narrowly-
tailored legislative responses.
